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SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL A N D  
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
This new research project at  IIASA is concerned with modeling technological change, and 
the broader economic developments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause 
and effect. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
The basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when attention 
is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address. 
Over the last decade considerable progress has been made on various techniques of dynamic 
economic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential and difference equa- 
tions, and some of i t  stochastic equations. Several models have been developed in which an 
economic analogue of "natural selection" winnows out a population whose members have dif- 
ferent attributes and different degrees of fitness. A number of efforts have taken advantage of 
the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional mathemat- 
ics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and economic 
dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differencers of technical advallce in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work at  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a great 
deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the level 
of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  seem 
associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
described above often has been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed 
t o  be explained, like the apparent phenomenon of dynamic increasing returns, or in other cases, 
understanding that  n many industries the distribution of firm sizes is approximately log normal. 
However, the connection between the theoretical work and the empirical phenomena has so far 
not been very close. The philosophy of this project is that  the chances of developing powerful 
new theory and useful new analytical techniques can be greatly enhanced by performing the work 
in an environment where scholars who understand the empirical phenomena provide questions 
and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
The research will focus upon the following three areas: 
1. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
2. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
3. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
Abstract 
Strategic interaction among autonomous decision-makers is usually modelled in 
economics in game-theoretic terms or within the framework of General Equilibrium. Game- 
theoretic and General Equilibrium models deal almost exclusively with the existence of 
equilibria and do not analyse the processes which might lead to them. Even when existence 
proofs can be given, two questior,r are still open. The first concerns the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, which game theory has shown to be the case even in very simple models and 
which makes the outcome of interaction unpredictable. The second relates to the 
computability and complexity of the decision procedures which agents should adopt and 
questions the possibility of reaching an equilibrium by means of an algorithmically 
implementable strategy. Some theorems have recently proved that in many economically 
relevant problems equilibria are not computable. 
A different approach to the problem of strategic interaction is a "constructivist" one. 
STLC~I a perspective, instead of being based upon an axiomatic view of human behaviour 
grounded on the principle of optimisation, focuses on algorithmically implementable 
"satisfycing" decision procedures. Once the axiomatic approach has been abandoned, decision 
procedures cannot be deduced from rationality assumptions, but must be the evolving 
outcome of a process of learning and adaptation to the particular environment in which the 
decision must be made. This paper considers one of the most recently proposed adaptive 
learning models: Genetic Programming and applies i t  to one the mostly studied and still 
controversial economic interaction environment, that of oligopolistic markets. 
Genetic Programming evolves decision procedures, represented by elements in the 
space of functions, balancing the exploitation of knowledge previously obtained with the 
search of more productive procedures. 
The results obtained are consistent with the evidence from the observation of the 
behaviour of real economic agents. 
As Kenneth Arrow - himself one of the major contributors to rational decision theory 
- puts it, a system of literally maximizing norm-free agents "... would be the end of organized 
society as we know it" [Arrow (1987), p. 2331. And indeed one only rarely observes 
behaviours and decision processes which closely resemble the canonical view from decision 
theory as formalized by von Neumann, Morgenstern, Savage and Arrow. 
What are then the characteristics of norm-guided behaviours? And wii~r; i l i '  norms 
come from? Can they be assumed to derive from some higher-level rational choice? Or can 
one show different kinds of processes accounting for their emergence? 
In this work we shall discuss these issues and present an evolutionary view of the 
emergence of norm-guided behaviours (i.e. routines) in economics. 
We shall call & all the procedures linking actions and some representation of the 
environment. In turn, representations are likely to involve relations between environmental 
states and variables and require the fulfilment of certain conditions (IF-THEN rules). It is a 
familiar definition in Artificial Intelligence and cognitive psychology (see Newel1 and Simon 
(1972) and Holland et al. (1986)). Of course representations may encompass both 
environmental states and internal states of the actor; and the action part may equally be a 
behaviour in the environment or an internal state, such as a cognitive act 1. 
Further, we shall call norms that subset of rules which pertain to socially interactive 
behaviours and, in addition, have the following characteristics: 
1) they are context-dependent (in ways that we shall specify below), and 
2) given the context, they are, to varying degrees, event independent, in the sense that, 
within the boundaries of a recognized context, they yield patterns of behaviour which are not 
contingent on particular states of the world. 
This definition of norms is extremely broad in scope and encompasses also 
behavioural routines, social conventions and morally constrained behaviours 2. Thus our 
definition includes the norm of not robbing banks, but excludes robbing or not robbing banks 
according to such criteria as expected utility maximization; it includes the "rules of the 
games" in game theoretical set-ups, but excludes the highly contingent behaviours which 
rational players are supposed by that theory to engage in thereafter. 
Our argument is divided into two parts. First, we ask what is the link between norms, 
so defined, and the "rational" decision model familiar in the economic literature. In particular 
we shall address the question whether, whenever one observes those types of norm-guided 
1 Clearly, this very general definition of rules includes as particular cases also the procedures for decision 
and action postulated by "rational" theories. 
2 These finer categorization are quite familiar in political sciences: see for example the discussion in Koford 
and Miller (1991). On the contrary, the broader notion of norms adopted here includes both moral constraints 
and positive behavioural prescriptions (i.e, both "morality" and "ethicality" in the sense of Hegel). 
behaviours, they can be referred back to some kind of higher-level rational act of choice 
among alternative patterns of action. We shall claim that this is not generally the case. The 
empirical evidence, even in simple contexts, of systematic departures of judgements and 
actions from the predictions of the rationality model is now overwhelming 3. Here however 
we are not going to discuss such evidence, rather we shall pursue a complementary line of 
enquiry and show that, with respect to an extremely broad set of problems, a 'rational' choice 
procedure cannot even be theoretically constructed, let alone adopted by empirical agents. 
Drawing from computation theory and from the results of Lewis (1985a) and (1985b), it can 
be shown that many choice set-ups involve algorithmically unsolvable problems: in other 
words, there is not and there cannot be a universal rational procedure of choice. An 
optimization procedure cannot be devised even in principle: this is the negative part of the 
argument. 
But what do people do, then? We shall suggest precisely that agents employ problem- 
solving rules and interactive norms, which: 1) cannot be derived from any general 
optimization criterion and, 2) are "robust", in the sense that they apply to entire classes of 
events and problems (Dosi and Egidi (1991)). 
The second part of this work considers the origin and nature of these rules. The cases 
we shall consider regard the emergence of corporate routines applied to the most familiar 
control variables in economics, i.e. prices and quantities. However, there appear to be no a 
priori reason to restrict the applicability of the argument to economic behaviours. In fact, a 
similar analytical approach could be applied to several other forms of patterned behaviour in 
social interactions. 
Concerning the origin of behavioural norms, we develop a model broadly in the 
perspective outlined by Holland (1975) and Holland et al. (1 986): various forms of inductive 
procedures generate, via adaptive learning and discovery, representations or "mental models" 
and, together, patterns of beha-v:uur: "the study of induction, then, is the study of how 
knowledge is modified through its use" (Holland et al. (1986), p.5). In our model, artificial 
computer-simulated agents progressively develop behavioural rules by building cognitive 
structures and patterns of action, on the grounds of initially randomly generated and 
progressively improved symbolic building blocks and no knowledge of the environment in 
which they are going to operate. The implementation technique is a modified version of 
Genetic Programming (c.f. Koza (1992) and (1993)), in which agents (firms) are modelled by 
sets of symbolically represented decision procedures which undergo structural modifications 
in order to improve adaptation to the environment. Learning takes place in an evolutionary 
fashion, and is driven by a selection dynamics whereby markets reward or penalize agents 
according to their revealed performances. 
3 Cf., for instance, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Herrnstein and 
Prelec (1991). 
A major point in the analysis which follows is that representations of the world in 
which agents operate and behavioural patterns co-evolve through the interaction with the 
environment and the inductive exploratory efforts of agents to make sense of it (actually, in 
our model, they cannot be explicitly distinguished) 4. Indeed, we show that, despite the 
complexity of the search space (technically, the space of h-functions), relatively coherent 
behavioural procedures emerge. Of course, none of us would claim that empirical agents do 
learn and adapt in a way which is anything like Genetic Programming, or, for that matter, any 
other artificially implementable formalism (but, similarly, we trust that no supporter of more 
rationalist views of behaviour would claim that human beings choose their course of action 
by using fixed-point theorems, Bellman equations, etc.). We do however conjecture that there 
might be a sort of "weak isomorphism" between artificial procedures of induction and the 
ways actual agents adapt to their environment. 
The final question that we address concerns the nature of the behavioural patterns that 
emerge through our process of learning and market selection. In particular, in the economic 
settings that we consider. are these patterns algorithmic approximation to the purported 
rational behaviours which the theory simply assumes? Or, do they have the katures of 
relatively invariant and context-specific norms (or routines) as defined earlier? It turns out 
that, in general, the latter appears to be the case: surviving agents display routines, like mark- 
up pricing or simple imitative behaviour (of the type "follow-the-leader") in all environments 
that we experimented, except the simplest and most stationary ones. Only in the latter do we 
see the emergence of behaviours not far from what supposedly rational agents would do (and, 
even then, cooperative behaviours are more likely to come out than what simple Nash 
equilibria would predict 5 ) .  The context dependence of emerging routines can be given a 
rather rigourous meaning: the degrees of complexity of the environment and of the problem- 
solving tasks can be mapped into the characteristics of the emerging routines. Interestingly 
enough, it appears that the higher the complexity, the simpler behavioural norms tend to be 
and the more potentially relevant information tends to be neglected. In that sense, social 
norms seem to be the typical and most robust form of evolutionary adaptation to uncertainty 
and change. 
In section 2 we shall show that, in general, it is theoretically impossible to assume that 
the rationality of behaviours could be founded in some kind of general algorithmic ability of 
the agents to get the right representation of the environment and choose the right course of 
action. Section 3 presents a model of inductive learning where representations and actions co- 
evolve. Finally, in section 4 we present some results showing the evolutionary emergence of 
4 On the evolution of representations, see also Margolis (1987). In economics, such a co-evolutionary 
perspective is held by a growing minority of practitioners. More on it can be found in Nelson and Winter 
(1982), Dosi et al. (1988), March (1988), Marengo (1992), Dosi and Marengo (1994), Arthur (1992). 
5 This is of course in line with the findings of Axelrod (1984) and Miller(1988). 
behavioural routines, such as mark-up pricing. In the appendix, we provide a more detailed 
treatment of some of the propositions of section 2. 
2 - Rational vs. norm-guided behaviour. 
Let us start from the familiar view of rational behaviour grounded on some sort of 
linear sequence leading from 1) representations to 2) judgment, 3) choice and, finally, 3) 
action. Clearly, that ideal sequence can apply to pure problem-solving (for example proving a 
theorem, discovering a new chemical compound with certain characteristics, etc.), as well as 
to interactive situations (how to deal with competitors, what to do if someone tries to mug 
you, etc. ). 
At least two assumptions are crucial to this 'rationalist' view, namely, first, that the 
linearity of the sequence strictly holds (for example one must rule out circumstances in which 
people act and then adapt their preferences and representations to what they l.;1lje already 
done) and, second, that at each step of the process the agents are able to build the appropriate 
algorithm in order to tackle the task at hand. Regarding the first issue, the literature in 
sociology and social psychology is rich of empirical counterexamples and alternative theories 
6. Indeed, in the next section of this work, we shall present a model whereby representations 
and actions co-evolve. 
The second issue is even more at the heart of the 'constructivist' idea of rationality so 
widespread in economics, claiming that agents are at the very least procedurally rational7 . In 
turn this implies that they could algorithmically solve every problem they had to face, if they 
were provided with the necessary information about the environment and the degrees of 
rationality of their possible opponents or partners. Conversely, the very notion of rational 
behaviour would turn out to be rather ambiguous if one could show that, even in principle, 
the appropriate algorithms cannot be constructed. 
It happens in fact that computability theory provides quite a few impossibility 
theorems, i.e. theorems showing examples of algorithmically unsolvable problems. Many of 
them bear direct implications also for the micro assumptions of economic theory and, 
particularly, for the possibility of 'naturally' assuming the algorithmic solubility of social and 
strategic interaction problems 8. We can distinguish between two kinds of impossibility 
6 See for discussions , among others, Elster(1986), Luhmann (1979), and with respect to economics, also 
Dosi and Metcalfe (1991) 
7 The central reference on the distinction between 'substantive' and 'procedural' rationality is of course 
Herbert Simon: see especially Simon (1976), (1981), (1986). 
8 See Lewis (1985a) and Rustem and Velupillai (1990). Note that, loosely speaking, algorithmic solvability 
means that one is able to define a recursive procedure that will get you, say, to a Nash equilibrium. This turns 
out to be a question quite independent from proving a theorem which shows the existence of such an 
equilibrium. 
results. First, it is possible to show the existence of classes of problems which are not solvable 
by means of a general recursive procedure (c.f. Lewis (1985a) and (1 985b)). This implies that 
economic agents who look for efficient procedures for the solution of specific problems 
cannot draw on general rules for the construction of algorithms, because such general rules do 
not and cannot exist (c.f., also, Dosi and Egidi (1991)). Broadly speaking, we can say that 
nobody may be endowed with the meta-algorithm for the generation of every necessary 
algorithm. 
Second, it is possible to prove the existence of single problems whose optimal solution 
cannot be implemented by means of specific algorithms. Hence one faces truly 
algorithmically unsolvable problems: economic agents cannot have readily available 
algorithms designing optimal strategies to tackle such problems. Therefore, unless they have 
been told what the optimal solutions are by an omniscient entity, they have actually to find 
other criteria and procedures to solve them in a 'satisfactory' way. In fact, they need novel 
criteria to define what a satisfactory solution is and inductively discover new procedures to 
accomplish their tasks (see e.g. Dosi and Egidi (1991)). 
Let us briefly exarmilt: ~trese two kinds of impossibility results: Lewis (1985a) and 
(1985b) proves a general result about the uncomputability of rational choice functions (on 
computable functions see also Cutland (1980) and Cohen (1987)). 
Let P(X) be the set of all subsets of a space of alternatives X where an asymmetric and 
transitive preference relation has been identified, we can roughly define a rational choice 
function as a set function C:P(X)+P(X) such that, for every AE P(X), C(A) is the set of 
acceptable alternatives 9. Lewis considers some compact, convex subset of Rn\{O} as the 
space X of alternatives. Among these alternatives he takes into account only the set of 
recursive real numbers in the sense of Kleene and Post, i.e. the set of real numbers which can 
be codified as natural numbers by means of a particular Godel numbering (for more details 
see Lewis (1985a)). Moreover, one operates directly on the codified values (which are called 
R-indices). Given a preference relation defined only on the space of R-indices and 
numerically representable by a computable function and given some non-triviality conditions, 
Lewis does not only show that the related rational choice function is uncomputable but also 
that so is its restriction over the sole decidable subsets 10. Even more important than the 
proposition on undecidable sets (since in this case it may seem that the uncomputability of the 
function necessarily derives from the undecidability of the subsets), the result concerning 
only its restriction to the decidable subsets of Rn is quite powerful. It means in P~LL that the 
functions are uncomputable even if their domains are computable. 
9 Given a preference relation > on a set of objects X and a nonempty set A belonging to X, the set of 
acceptable alternatives is defined as: 
c(A,>) = {xEA: there is no YEA such that y>x}. 
10 Broadly speaking, we call a set decidable if there exist an algorithm which is always able to completely 
identify its elements, i.e. if the membership function which characterizes the set is computable. 
Obviously this result does not imply that the optimal solution cannot be 
algorithmically determined for every AE P(X). Lewis' theorems actually prove only that no 
automatic procedure can generate uniformly optimal solutions over the whole family of 
optimization problems identified by the set of all recursive subsets of R-indices of elements 
of X. This would be true even if there existed some specific solution algorithm for every 
single problem of this family (see Lewis (1985a), p. 67). This result shows actually that there 
exist small enough classes (i.e. not so broad to be meaningless from a decision-theoretic point 
of view) of well-structured choice problems whose solution cannot be obtained by means of a 
general recursive procedure. 
In economic theory, environmental or social interactions are usually represented by 
using subsets of Rn as spaces of alternative strategies. Thus, Lewis' results can be naturally 
extended to give proof of the generic uncomputability of the class of general economic 
equilibria and consequently of the class of Nash equilibria for games (see Lewis (1987)). 
Indeed every definition of General Equilibrium requires that agents be able to solve optimally 
some decision problems, Although Lewis' result is only a general impossibility one, which 
does not imply the uncomputability of single equilibria, its significance should not be 
underestimated. 
Concerning game theory, it is possible to find even stronger results about the 
computability of Nash equilibria for specific games. Rabin's theorem (see Rabin (1957) and 
Lewis (1985a)) shows that there is at least one infinite stage, two-person, zero-sum game with 
perfect information, whose optimal strategies are uncomputable. This is a particular Gale- 
Stewart game, which can be described as follows: let g:N+N be a predefined total function; 
player A moves first and chooses an integer i~ N; then player B, knowing A's choice, chooses 
j~ N; finally, A, who knows both i and j, chooses k~ N. If g(k)=i+j, A wins the game, 
otherwise B does. Gale-Stewart games admit always the existence of one winning strategy: if 
N\range(g) is infinite, whatever i has been chosen by A, B has at least one reply which let him 
win the game, otherwise A does. Consequently, it is easy to show that every Gale-Stewart 
game has infinite Nash equilibria, with at least a subgame perfect one among them. Now, let 
g be computable and let range(g) be a recursively enumerable set S such that N\S is infinite 
and does not have any infinite recursively enumerable subset 1 1. In such a case Rabin's 
theorem states that this game has no computable winning strategies. Moreover it is important 
to notice that the existence of simple sets has been proved (see Cutland (1980)), so that 
Rabin's theorern provides a strong result about the existence of games wherein there exist 
Nash equilibria which are not algorithmically realizable. 
Another example from the second group of results mentioned in the text can be found 
in the properties of Post systems. A Post system (Post (1943)) is a formal logical system 
11 A recursively enumerable set can be defined as a set whose partial characteristic function is computable 
or, equivalently, as the range of some computable function (see e.g. Cutland (1980) or Cohen (1987)). 
defined by a set of transformation rules, which operate on symbolic strings, and by a set of 
initial strings (for more details see Cutland (1980)). The problem of establishing whether a 
string can be generated by the initial set of a fixed Post system is called a 'word problem'. 
Through computability theory it is possible to show that there is an infinite number of Post 
systems whose word problems are unsolvable even by specific algorithms (see e.g. 
Thrakhtenbrot (1 963)). This result has a wide significance in the economic domain. Consider 
for example production theory: it is possible to show that there is no guarantee that optimal 
productive p~ocesses can be algorithmically identified, even under exogenous tech~lical 
progress. Therefore it is impossible to assume that economic agents make always use of 
optimal processes without giving a context-specific proof. 
It is worth emphasising that these impossibility results entail quite disruptive 
implications not only for the 'constructivist' concept of rationality, but also for the so-called 
as-ifhypothesis (see Friedman (1953) and the discussion in Winter (1986)). In order to 
assume that agents behave as if they were rational maximizers, one needs to represent a 
thoroughly autonomous selection process which converges to an optimal strategy equilibrium, 
i.e. one must be able to formalize something like an automatic procedure which ends up with 
the elimination of every non-optimizing agent (or behaviour). 
However, the first group of results mentioned above, implies that, for some classes of 
problems, we are not allowed to assume the existence of a general and algorithmically 
implementable selection mechanism leading in finite time to the exclusive survival of optimal 
behaviours. In addition, the second group of results provides examples where one can 
definitely rule out the existence of every such a selection mechanism. 
Moreover, the minimal prerequisite one needs for a selection-based as-ifhypothesis 
on behavioural rationality is the existence of some agents who use the optimal strategy in the 
first place (c.f. Winter (1971)). But, if the set of optimal strategies is undecidable, how can 
we be sure of having endowed some agent with one optimal strategy? An approximate easy 
answer could be that if we consider a sufficiently large population of differentiated agents, we 
can safely suppose that some of them play optimal strategies and will be eventually selected. 
But how big should our population be, given that we cannot have any idea about the size of 
the set of possible strategies? 
Finally there is also a problem of complexity which arises in connection with rational 
behaviour (both under a "constructivist" view and under the as-ifhypothesis). Broadly 
speaking, we can roughly define the complexity of a problem as the speed of the best 
computation processes we could theoretically use to solve it (c.f., e.g., Cutland (1980)). But 
then the speed of environmental change becomes a crucial issue: as Winter (1986) and Arthur 
(1992) pointed out, the as-ifview is primarily connected with a situation without change. In 
fact, even when the only kind of change we allow is an exogenous one, a necessary, albeit by 
no means sufficient condition for the hypothesis to hold is that the speed of convergence be 
higher than the pace of change. However, it is easy to find many examples of games whose 
optimal strategies, while existing and being computable, require too much time to be 
effectively pursued even by a modern computer 12. 
Even more so, all these results on uncomputability apply to non-stationary 
environments, wherein the 'fundamentals' of the economy are allowed to change and, in 
particular, various types of innovation always appear. Hence, in all such circumstances, which 
plausibly are the general case with respect to problem-solving and social interactions, agents 
cannot be assumed to 'naturally' possess the appropriate rational algorithm for the true 
representation of their environment (whatever that means) and for the computation of the 
correct action procedures (note that, of course, these impossibility theorems establish only the 
upper bound of computability for empirical agents). 
A fundamental consequence of these negative results is that one is then required to 
explicitly analyze the processes of formation of representations and behavioural rules. 
This is what we shall do in the next section, by considering the emergence of rules of 
cognition/action in some familiar economic examples of decision and interaction. 
3 - Genetic Proyramminy as a model of ~rocedural earning. 
Genetic Programming (cf. Koza (1992) and (1993)) is a computational model which 
simualtes learning and adaptation through a search in the space of representations/procedures. 
Similarly to John Holland's Genetic Algorithms (c.f. Holland (1975)), Genetic Programming 
(GP henceforth) pursues learning and adaptation by processing in an evolutionary fashion a 
population of structures which are represented by fixed length binary strings in the case of 
Genetic Algorithms and by symbolic functions in the case of GP. 
In GP the learning system (an artificial learning agent) is endowed with a set of basic 
"primitive" operations (such as the four arithmetic operations, Boolean operators, if-then 
operators) and combine them in order to build complex procedures (functions) which map 
environmental variables into actions. Each artificial agent is represented by a set of such 
procedures and learns to adapt to the environment through an evolutionary process which 
involves both fitness-driven selection among existing procedures and generation of new ones 
through mutation and genetic recombination (cross-over) of the old ones. 
General features of this model are the following: 
1 - Representations and rule behaviour: a common feature to many computational models of 
learning, including the one presented here, is that of modeling the learning process not just as 
acquisition of information and probability updating, but as modification of representations 
and models of the world. But contrary to other similar models (such as genetic algorithms and 
- 
12 Think for instance to the game of Chess or to the Rubik cube. 
classifiers systems), genetic programming (GP henceforth) models learning and adaptation as 
an explicit search in the space of procedures, i.e. functions in their symbolic representation, 
which link perceived environmental states to actions 13. 
2 - Adaptive selection: each artificial agent stores in its memory a set of alternative 
procedures of representationlaction and selects at each moment of time a preferred one 
according to its fitness, i.e. the payoff cumulated by each procedure in the past. 
3 - Generation of new rules: learning does not involve only adaptive selection of the most 
effective decision rules among the existing ones, but also generation of new ones. Learning 
and adaptation require a calibration of the complicated trade-off between exploitation and 
refinement of the available knowledge and exploration of new possibilities. GP uses genetic 
recombination to create new sequences of functions: sub-procedures of the existing most 
successful ones are re-combined with the cross-over operator in order to generate new and 
possibly more effective combinations. 
In GP symbolic functions are represented by trees, whose nodes contain either 
operators or variables. Operators have connections (as many as the number of operands they 
need) to other operators and/or variables, if they are variables they do ns t  have, of course, any 
further connection and constitute therefore the leaves of the tree. 
Thus, every node can be chosen in a set of basic function (e.g. the arithmetic, 
Boolean, relation, if-then operators) plus some variables and constants: 
BF = {+,-,*,+ ,......., OR,AND,NOT, >, <, = ,.... vl,v2,v3 ,... cl,c2,c3 ,......I 
But basic functions can be freely defined depending on the kind of problem which is being 
faced (see Koza (1993) for a wide range of examples of applications in different problem 
domains). 
The execution cycle of a GP system proceeds along the following steps: 
0) an initial set of functionltrees is randomly generated. Each tree is created by randomly 
selecting a basic function; if the latter needs parameters, other basic functions are 
randomly selected for each connection. The operation continues until variables (which can 
be considered as zero-parameter functions) close every branch of the tree. 
1) once a population of trees is so created, the relative strength of each function is determined 
by calcuting its own fitness in the given environment. 
2) a new generation of functions/trees is generated. Two mechanisms serve this purpose: 
selection and genetic operators. Selection consists in preserving the fittest rules and 
discarding the less fit ones. Genetic operators instead generate new rules by modifying and 
recombining the fittest among the existing ones. The generation of new (possibly better) 
functionsltrees in GP is similar to the genetic operators proposed by Holland for the 
13 A more general formal tool in the same spirit and which we intend to apply in the near future is presented 
in Fontana ( 1  992) and Fontana and Buss (1994), applied in the domain of biology to self-reproducing systems. 
Genetic Algorithms and is mainly based on the cross-over operators 14. Cross-over 
operates by selecting randomly two nodes in the parents' trees and swapping the sub-trees 
which have such nodes as roots. 
Consider for example the two parents functions: 
P I  := X + (Y*Z) - Z and P2 := Z I (Y*X) - A 
which are depicted below in their tree representation. Suppose that node 4 in the first 
function and node 7 in the second one are randomly selected: cross-over will generate two 
new 'off-spring' trees which correspond to the functions: 
OS1 : = X + ( A - Z )  and O S 2 : = Z / ( Y * X ) - ( Y * Z )  
Such off-spring substitute the weakest existing rules, so that the number of rules which are 
stored at every moment in time is kept constant. 
3) go back to I). 
14 For a discussion of the power of cross-over as a device for boosting adaptation, see Holland (1975) and 
Goldberg (1989). 
Parent 1 Parent 2 
4 - Learnin? pricin~ procedures in olieo~olistic markets. 
Let us consider one of the most typical problems of economic interaction, namely, an 
oligopolistic market. A small group of firms face a downward-sloped and unknown demand 
curve, and have to set simultaneously their prices at discrete time intervals. To do so they can 
observe both the past values taken by the relevant market variables (quantity and prices) and 
the current value of such firm-specific variables as costs. However, they do not know either 
the parameters of the demand function or the prices competitors are about to set. Ovce all 
prices have been simultaneously set, the corresponding aggregate demand can be determined 
and individual market shares are updated according to relative prices. 
This interactive set-up and the substantive uncertainty about both the exogenous 
environment (i.e. the demand function) and the competitors' behaviour require agents to 
perform a joint search in the space of representations and in the space of decision functions: 
GP seems therefore a natural way of modeling it. 
Let us examine more precisely the structure of the market we analyse in our 
simulations. There ex~st  an exogtrlous linear demand function: 
p = a - b q  a,b > 0 (1) 
and n firms which compete in this market by choosing a price pi. Firms are supposed to start- 
up all with the same market share si: 
~i (0) = lln i = 1, ...., n 
Price decisions are taken independently (no communication is possible between firms) and 
simultaneously at regular time intervals (t = 1,2, .......). Each firms is supposed to incur into a 
constant unitary cost ci for each unit of production. Once all decisions have been taken, the 
aggregate market price can be computed as the average of individual prices: 
p(t> = Xsi(t)pi(t) ( 2 )  
and the corresponding demanded quantity is thus determined. Such a quantity is devided up 
into individual shares which evolve according to a sort of replicator dynamics equation in 
discrete time: 
Asi(t> = r] [p(t)/ pi(t) - l)Isi(t-l) (3) 
where r] is the reciprocal of the degree of inertia of the market15. 
- - 
15 Note that this replication-type dynamics is consistent with the assumptions of homogenous-good c,u ,ti: 
whenever one allows for imperfect information or search cl i  111 inertial behaviour by consumers. Thc iatter 
are not explicitly modelled here but they implicitly underlay the system-level mechanisms of formation of 
industry demand and their distribution across firms as defined by eqs. (1) to (3). The possible metaphor of 
these mechanisms is the following sequence: i) each firm sets its price; ii) a "public statistical office" collects 
all of them and announces the "price index" of the period (as from eq. (2) ); iii) on the grounds of that index 
consumers decide the quantity they want to buy; iv) as a function of the difference between the announced 
average price and the price charged by their previous-period suppliers, consumers decide whether to stick to 
them or go to a lower-price one. Clearly, the stochastic reformulation of eq. form would be more adequate to 
describe the mechanism, but, for our purposes, the main property that we want to capture - namely, inertial 
adjustment of the market to price differential - is retained also by the simpler deterministic dynamics. Were 
Finally, individual profits are given by: 
n i ( t )  = [pi(t) - ci(t)I si(t) q(t) - Fi (4) 
where Fi are fixed costs, independent of the scale of production, but small enough to aloud 
the firms to break-even for an E excess of prices over variable costs, were they to pursue 
Bertrand-type competition. 
We model these firms as artificial agents, each represented by an autonomous GP 
system, which, at each time step t, must select one pricing rule among those which it 
currently stores. Each artificial agent can observe at each rnoment of time t the following past 
(i:e. the values taken at time t-1) variables: 
- average industry price p(t- 1), 
- aggregate demanded quantity q(t- 1), 
- individual prices of each agent pi(t-1), for i = 1,2, ... n 
- own unitary cost ci(t-1) 
- own market share si(t-1) 
mnrcover it can observe i t s  current unitary cost ci(t). 
Each agent is then endowed with a few basic "elementary" operations, i.e. the four 
arithmetic operations, if-then operators, Boolean operators and equalitylinequality operators, 
in addition a few integers are given as constant to each GP system. 
Each agent's decision rules are randomly generated at the outset, and a preferred one is 
chosen for action in a random way, with probabilities proportional the payoffs cumulated by 
each rule in the previous iterations. Periodically, new rules are generated through cross-over 
and replace the weaker ones. 
agents to behave as in conventional Bertrand models, eq. (3) would still converge, in the limit, to canonic 
Bertrand equilibria. 
It must be also pointed out that our model is not concerned with the population dynamics of the industry but 
primarily with the evolution of pricing rules. Therefore we artificially set a minimum market share (1 %) under 
In order to test the learning capabilities of the model we started with the simplest 
model with a single agent in a monopolistic mark.--:. ,"!is shown in Figure 1, in this case with 
constant costs and stable demand, price converges rapidly to the optimal one. Figure 2 
presents the behaviour l 6  of our artificial monopolist in more complex situations in which 
both costs and the parameters of the demand curve randomly shift. It can be noticed that, in 
spite of the complexity of the task, our artificial monopolist "learns" a pricing rule which 
behaves approximately like the optimal one l7. 
Figum 1 - Monopoly in a Stationary Environment 
which firms cannot shrink. According to the past performance record, firms may die, in which case they are 
replaced by a new agent which stocastically recombines some of the behavioural rules of the incumbents. 
16 For an easier interpretation, we plot in these figures only the last 100 iterations of the best emerging rule. 
17 In this case and in the following ones the pricing rules which are actually learnt by our artificial agents are 
usually long and difficult to semantically interpret, but they behave "as i f '  nearly optimal pricing rules. 
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Let us now consider an oligopolistic market. We explore two different environmental 
and learning scenarios. In the first one we suppose that the demand function is fixed and 
equal to: 
p = 10000 - 10q 
Moreover, unitary costs, identical for every agent, are a random variable uniformly 
distributed on a finite support. Finally, on the representationlaction side, our artificial agents 
are allowed to experiment each set of rules, on average, for 100 iterations. 
In figure 3 we report the results of a simulation which concerns an oligopolistic 
market with 9 firms. The average price is plotted against costs, while in figure 4 we report 
some price series for individual firms. It appears that many firms, as for example firm 4 in the 
particular simulation that we show, follow a pricing strategy which strictly follows cost 
variations. 
Fig.3 - Oligopoly: Inertial Learning Case 
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Although emerging rules are usually quite complex l8,  they behave "as if" they were simple 
mark-up rules. Another typical behaviour tlxar we observe is a follow-the-leader type of 
Figure 4a - Oligopoly: Inertial Learning 
Costs and Prices of Agent '4' 
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Figure 4b - Prices of Agent '0' and Agent '2' 
pricing rule - in two out of nine firms (e.g. firm 0). Following the agent with lowest mark-up 
level is an extremely simple pricing rule (as other agents' prices in t-1 are directly observable) 
3000 -- 
2000 -- 
1000 -- 
0 7 
which allows anyway a positive average rate of profit. Moreover, with a higher number of 
t- 
18 The complexity of the rules is at least partly due to the fact that our agents have to produce constants 
(such as mark-up coefficients) that they do not possess in their set of primitive operations and have therefore to 
be obtained by means of such operations on variables as to yield constant values (e.g. (X+X)/X = 2). 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
firms, the complexity of the coordination task increases and this, in turn, favours the 
emergence of simple imitative behaviour19. 
Figure 5 - Oligopoly: Continuous Adjustment Case 
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Under the second scenario, the intercept of the demand function randomly fluctuates, 
drawing from uniform distribution on the support [8000 - 120001. In addition, the individual 
unitary costs are given by the ratio between two variables: a component which is common to 
the entire industry and is represented by a random variable uniformly distributed over the 
interval [0,8000] and an individual productivity component, different for each firm, which is 
a random walk with a drift. Finally, in this scenario, we allow agents to change stochastically 
their sequencies of rule at each period, i.e. to switch among the procedures of 
representationlaction which they store. In this way, one forces behavioural variability (and, of 
course, this decreases predictability of each and every competitor). This extreme learning set 
up prevents any rule from settling down and from proving its value in the long term, while 
facing rather stable behaviours of the competitors. Despite all this, the main conclusions 
reached under the former scenario hold: mark-up type policies still turn out to be the most 
19 Econometric estimates of the form: 
lnp, =a+p, Inp,-,+ ...+yo lnc, +y,  lnc,-,+ ... 
for the industry as a whole, always yield R2 above 0.90 with significant coefficients for current costs and the 
first lag on prices only, and always insignificant lagged costs. Conversely, for the majority of the firms, no 
lagged variable significantly adds to the explanation: firms appear to follow a stationary rule of the simplest 
mark-up type, pr  = ,, (C1). However, for some firms (the "imitators") current prices seem to be set as a log- 
I 1 
linear combination between costs and lagged average prices of the industry, or the lagged price of one of the 
competitors (as in the example presented in figure 4). 
frequent and most efficient response to environmental uncertainty20. Figure 5 and 6 illustrate 
costs and price dynamics for the industry 
In other exercises, not shown here, we consider similar artificial agents whose control 
variables are quantities rather than prices. Again, as in the example presented above, a 
monopolist facing a stationary environment does discover the optimal quantity rule. However, 
under strategic interactions the agents do not appear to converge to the underlying Cournot- 
Nash equilibrium, but, rather, cooperative behaviours emerge. In particular, in the duopoly 
cnst, the decision rule has "Tit-for-tat" features (cf. Axelrod (1984)) and displays a paltern of 
the type "do at time t what your opponent did at time t-1". 
Figure 6 - Oligopoly: Continuous Adjustment Case 
Costs and Prices of Market Leader 
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It has been already mentioned that a straightforward "semantic" interpretation of the 
procedures which emerge is often impossible. However, their inspection - in the simplest 
cases - together with the examination of the behavioural patterns that they entail, allows an 
assessment of their nature. Some remarkable patterns appear. First, procedures which "look 
like" optimization rules emerge only in rather simple and stationary environmea;!.;. Second, as 
the complexity of the representation/decision problem increases, rules evolve toward simpler 
20 As may be expected, estimates of the form presented in footnote 15 yield somewhat lower R2 as 
compared to the previous case - both for the industry aggregate and for the individual firms -, but still most 
often in the range between 0.6 and 0.8. 
Also the other properties of individual pricing procedures stand, and in particular simple stationary rules 
characterize the most successful players, as assessed in terms of cumulated profits or average market shares. 
Finally, in analogy to the previous learning scenario, the adjustment dynamics in aggregate prices - where the 
first lag on prices themselves turns out to be significant - appear to be due primarily to an aggregation effect 
over most often stationary rules (for a general theoretical point on this issue, cf. Lippi (1988)). 
ones, involving the neglect of notionally useful information and very little contingent 
behaviour. More precisely, the procedure which the evolutionary dynamics appear to select 
either neglect the strategic nature of the interactive set-up - thus transforming the decision 
problem into a game "against nature" - or develop very simple imitative behaviours. In all 
these circumstances the resulting collective outcomes of the interaction significantly depart 
from the equilibria prescribed by a theory of behaviours grounded on standard rationality 
assumptions (this applies both to the Cournot-Nash and to the Bertrand set-ups, 
corresponding to quantity-based and price-bascd decision rules). 
5 - Conclusions. 
In this work we have begun to explore the properties of the procedures of 
representationldecision which emerge in an evolutionary fashion via adaptive learning and 
stochastic exploration in a space of elementary functions. Following a negative argu~-,.:-*+ ;)n
the general impossibility of endowing agents with scrmts genezrc. and natural optimization 
algorithms, we presented some preliminary exercises on the co-evolution of cognition and 
action rules. The results highlight the evolutionary robustness of procedures which - except 
for the simplest environments - have the characteristics of norms or routines, as defined 
earlier. Of course one can easily object that real agents indeed base their understanding of the 
world on a pre-existing cognitive structure much more sophisticated than the elementary 
functions we have assumed here, and that therefore our result might not bear any implication 
for the understanding of the actual evolution of norms. On the other hand, the problem 
solving tasks that empirical agents (and, even more so, real organizations) face are several 
orders of magnitude more complex than those depicted in this work. There is no claim of 
realism in the model we have presented, however we suggest that some basic features of the 
evolution of the rules for cognition and action presented here might well hold in all those 
circumstances where a "representation gap" exists between the ability that agents pre-possess 
in interpreting their environment and the "true" structure of the latter. This is obviously a 
field of analysis where stylized modelling exercises on evolutionary learning can only 
complement more inductive inquiries from e.g. social psychology and organizational 
sciences. 
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